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D
uring the past couple of years, policy-makers in Washington and other
capitals of G-7 countries have been ﬂogging the idea that the function-
ing of the world’s ﬁnancial markets must be improved by making it eas-
ier for insolvent governments,especially in emerging markets,to obtain debt relief
from their bondholders and bankers.
Most savvy investors, ﬁnancial intermediaries, and emerging-market govern-
ment ofﬁcials,however,are at a loss to understand why the G-7and the Internation-
al Monetary Fund (IMF) believe the international ﬁnancial system would function
better if there were speciﬁc mechanisms to facilitate sovereign bankruptcies.
The main reason U.S.–chartered corporations that cannot pay their creditors
subject themselves to wrenching reorganizations before entering into, or once
under, Chapter 11 of the U.S. bankruptcy code is that the alternative is their out-
right liquidation under the code’s Chapter 7.Sovereign governments,in contrast,
do not operate under the threat of liquidation, and despite the strong rights that
bondholders have on paper under New York, British, and other law, practical
experience indicates that the enforcement of claims against sovereign govern-
ments is exceedingly difﬁcult.Whereas delinquent corporations can be hauled,de
jure and de facto,before a bankruptcy court and be forced to change management,
restructure operations, dispose of assets, or even liquidate to pay off claims, gov-
ernments are not subjected to any of that.Chapter 9 of the U.S.bankruptcy code
is similarly unhelpful as a model for how to restructure the liabilities of bankrupt
governments, since it does not apply to sovereign entities, such as U.S. states and
counties, which under the U.S. Constitution are ensured to remain free of feder-
al government interference.1
Consequently, those in the business of issuing, underwriting, or investing in 
sovereign bonds are generally of the view that, if anything, international reforms
should focus on making contracts easier to enforce and on facilitating the con-
structive involvement of bondholders and other private-sector creditors in debt-
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© 2003 Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs.restructuring negotiations.2 Yet the G-7 has not called for any actions or penalties
against irresponsible governments,such as the attachment of their ofﬁcial interna-
tional reserves when they are on deposit with central banks like the U.S. Federal
Reserve or with the Bank for International Settlements, the central banks’ central
bank. At present, for example, the investors who have ﬁled suits against Argentina
in New York and other jurisdictions because ofthe default that took place more than
a year and a half ago cannot get their hands on the billions of dollars that the gov-
ernment of that country has sheltered in those G-7 institutions.The G-7 initiatives
have not contemplated any incentives—let alone principles or procedures––for
ensuring that governments become more accountable for their ﬁnancial obliga-
tions.3 The intent of the initiatives is wholly one-sided: to expedite the granting of
debt relief on the part of bondholders and other private-sector creditors.
THE RECORD SPEAKS
Although various proposals for resolving debt crises have been advanced,they all
suppose that the lack of collective action among private-sector lenders and
investors is the main obstacle to the smooth functioning of the international
ﬁnancial system.4
Yet there is little if any empirical support for this claim. On the contrary, pri-
vate creditors have been much more progressive, ﬂexible, and quick in dealing
with sovereign insolvency situations than have been ofﬁcial lenders––and the gap
in their different responses is growing. In fact, private lenders have provided a
good example for how ofﬁcial bilateral and multilateral lenders might themselves
deal more fairly and effectively with sovereign insolvency situations.
The absence of innovative mechanisms has not impeded several landmark
workouts of sovereign indebtedness.The governments of Ecuador,Pakistan,Rus-
sia, and the Ukraine, for example, have all been able to restructure their bonded
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4 According to the ﬁrst deputy managing director of the IMF, a new approach to sovereign debt restruc-
turing is needed because “in the current environment,it may be particularly difﬁcult to secure high partic-
ipation from creditors as a group, as individual creditors may consider that their best interests would be
served by trying to free ride ....These difﬁculties may be ampliﬁed by the prevalence of complex ﬁnancial
instruments ...which in some cases may provide investors with incentives to hold out ...rather than par-
ticipating in a restructuring” [emphasis added]. See Anne O. Krueger, A New Approach To Sovereign Debt
Restructuring(Washington,D.C.:International Monetary Fund,April 2002),p.8;available at www.imf.org/
external/pubs/ft/exrp/sdrm/eng/sdrm.pdf.debt in recent years––and have done so in record time. Substantial debt-service
relief and even sizable debt forgiveness have been obtained through the use of
exchange offers, often accompanied by bondholder exit consents that encourage
the participation of as many investors as possible in take-it-or-leave-it settle-
ments.Rather than amending bond covenants,the exchange offers typically entail
the debtor government presenting its private creditors with a menu of voluntary
options, such as accepting new bonds for a fraction (for example, 60 percent) of
the principal owed but paying a market interest rate, or new bonds for the origi-
nal principal but paying a concessional interest rate.Experience has demonstrat-
ed that neither the threat oflitigation nor actual cases oflitigation have obstructed
these debt restructurings,which have involved large,institutional as well as small,
retail investors throughout the world.5
The latest case involves the government of Uruguay, which earlier this year
asked investors to consider a debt-restructuring request, and more than 90 per-
cent of them agreed, enabling the operation to be consummated in a matter of
several weeks.6 The Uruguayan authorities previously spent many months debat-
ing the nature of the restructuring with the IMF. The IMF wanted Uruguay to
default on its obligations to bondholders just like Argentina had done, with the
intention of obtaining massive debt forgiveness from private creditors, but the
Uruguayan authorities refused to go down this potentially ruinous path.The gov-
ernment wanted to pursue,instead,a market-friendly debt exchange with the sole
purpose of stretching out the maturities falling due in 2003 and the next several
years, while respecting the original amounts owed and continuing to make the
requisite interest payments. It was only after the Uruguayan authorities sought
and obtained support from the U.S.Treasury and the Federal Reserve that the IMF
staff backed down and agreed to support a voluntary debt exchange.7
Once an understanding between the IMF and Uruguay was reached,matters
moved rather quickly. Informal discussions with private creditors were held in
March of this year, a concrete proposal was put forth in April, investor replies
were received in May, and by June Uruguay’s bonded debt had been successful-
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6 See the statement by the U.S. attorneys for Uruguay, Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, “Uruguay in
Groundbreaking $5.2 Billion Debt Restructuring,” Press Release, May 29, 2003;a vailable at
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7 See the TV interview with President Jorge Batlle of Uruguay,“El Default Signiﬁcaba el Quiebre Institu-
cional de Uruguay,” July 4, 2003;a vailable at www.presidencia.gub.uy/sic/noticias/archivo/2003/julio/
2003070404.htm. This version of events had previously been revealed by Vice President Luis Hierro of
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C. Dawson,”June 26, 2003;a vailable at www.imf.org/external/np/tr/2003/tr030626.htm.ly restructured. This was accomplished despite the fact that the investor base
was scattered around the globe: the operation involved from retail investors in
Argentina and Japan to institutional investors in the United States and Europe,
all of whom were bound by contracts written in several jurisdictions,each with
its own currency and distinct legal features.
The cases of Bolivia,Nicaragua,and Ecuador,with which this author had some
involvement, highlight the difference between how private and ofﬁcial creditors
have treated governments in serious ﬁnancial trouble. Back in 1988,c ommercial
bank creditors ﬁrst forgave nearly 90 percent of what the government of Bolivia
owed them, and in 1993 they wrote off nearly 85 percent of the then-remaining
principal.8 In contrast, the country became eligible for debt relief from ofﬁcial
bilateral and multilateral creditors under the original Highly Indebted Poor Coun-
tries (HIPC) initiative a full decade later, in September 1998, and under the
Enhanced HIPC initiative only in June 2001.9
In 1995,c ommercial bank creditors forgave more than 90 percent of what the
government of Nicaragua owed them. In contrast, ofﬁcial bilateral creditors rep-
resented by the Paris Club canceled less than 55 percent of the outstanding obli-
gations at about the same time, with no debt relief coming from the multilateral
agencies. The country never became eligible for debt relief under the original
HIPC initiative, and will not qualify for the beneﬁts of the Enhanced HIPC ini-
tiative prior to 2004, although the Paris Club creditors recently agreed to cancel
the equilvalent of one-fourth of Nicaragua’s remaining debt obligations.10
In 1995,private creditors also granted a mix of debt and interest forgiveness to
the government of Ecuador, as part of a comprehensive Brady-style settlement.
Creditors accepted the choice ofeither writing off45percent ofthe principal owed
while stretching out the maturity dates for repayment of the remainder for thirty
years, or charging highly concessional interest rates for thirty years. The holders
of nearly 60 percent of the total debt chose to provide principal relief, while the
remainder chose to provide long-term interest-rate forgiveness. When Ecuador
experienced acute economic difﬁculties again in 1999,the IMF made it clear to the
government that it would not get any help from the ofﬁcial community unless it
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Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative,” Press Release, December 13, 2002;a vailable at
www.clubdeparis.org/rep_upload/PR01.pdf.defaulted to private creditors and obtained debt forgiveness once again.11Shut out
of IMF and other ofﬁcial ﬁnancial support,the government had no choice but to
declare a default. Before long, Ecuador’s bondholders were formally requested to
grant permanent debt relief––and by August 2000they had forgiven about 40per-
cent of what was owed to them.
In contrast,ofﬁcial bilateral and multilateral lenders have not granted any debt
forgiveness to Ecuador. The country was deemed by the IMF to be insolvent
enough to deserve write-offs from private creditors––but not poor enough to
deserve write-offs from the ofﬁcial development community.Paris Club creditors
have therefore agreed merely to reschedule about one-third of debt-service pay-
ments falling due between  May 2000and May 2001 and between March 2003and
March 2004 according to the Houston Terms, the least generous of all Paris Club
poor countries’debt treatments.Thus Ecuador has continued to be charged most-
ly market interest rates and is expected to repay the bulk of its obligations as they
mature.12 Meanwhile, it is still business as usual at the multilateral agencies: they
have not rescheduled, never mind forgiven, any of Ecuador’s debt, and they have
provided little new money.In fact,from 2000 to 2002,amortization payments by
Ecuador to the multilateral agencies exceeded disbursements from those agen-
cies.13 Once interest payments made to the multilateral agencies are factored in,it
becomes clear that Ecuador has made substantial net transfers to the official
community.
THE G-7’S UNDERLYING RATIONALE
What then is the rationale of the G-7 and the IMF in devoting so much time and
effort to facilitating future workouts of sovereign debt to private creditors? Appar-
ently, G-7 and IMF ofﬁcials are trying to ameliorate the undesirable consequences
of their recent practice of bailing out certain troubled sovereign debtors with multi-
billion-dollar rescue packages. Stung by criticism of these bailouts, and worried
about having encouraged too many countries with looming debt crises to come
knocking at their door pleading for last-minute help, the G-7 governments have
22 Arturo C. Porzecanski
ROUNDTABLE
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13 See International Monetary Fund, “Ecuador: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix,” IMF Country
Report No. 03/91,April 2003,p .112;a vailable at www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2003/cr0391.pdf.wanted to open up an alternative for themselves––a fast track to default, debt for-
giveness (at least by private lenders), and ﬁnancial resurrection. Thus, when in the
future an overindebted government that is not strategically important approaches
the G-7 for emergency ﬁnancial help,it will no longer be able to claim that it must
get billions of dollars because the alternative is a hopelessly disruptive,delayed,and
uncertain default with potential spillover effects around the globe.With some kind
of sovereign bankruptcy procedure in place,the G-7would feel freer to tell that gov-
ernment to seek debt forgiveness from its private creditors,instead,on the beliefthat
a relatively painless and quick debt restructuring would follow.
From late 2001 until early 2003,the IMF staff worked feverishly on a proposed
Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) that, however, has not yet
gained the necessary political support among a number of governments, includ-
ing the United States. Its earlier versions envisioned a powerful role for the IMF
that would have allowed it to make decisions limiting creditors’rights.In the face
ofuniversal criticism from private-sector lenders and investors,the IMF’s role was
later toned down to the equivalent of the sole expert witness,by passing judgment
on how much debt any government could reasonably be expected to service. In
this capacity,the IMF and its G-7 shareholders on its executive board would have
a procedural advantage that would allow them to protect their claims and inﬂu-
ence the amount of debt relief granted by private creditors.
The planned SDRM was not accompanied,however,by a proposal to address
what has really undermined the functioning of the international ﬁnancial system
in recent years: the multibillion-dollar G-7 and IMF rescue packages that have
been put together for strategically important countries since 1995.T hanks to the
string of bailouts involving countries from Mexico to South Korea, and from
Brazil to Turkey, the possibility that a country may get a huge package of ﬁnan-
cial support with which to meet its debt obligations has become one of the key
elements in the assessment of sovereign creditworthiness. Many credit ratings,
analyst recommendations, and investment decisions are based on assumptions
about whether a foreign government is viewed with favor by the White House,
Downing Street, or another G-7 government. The situation is akin to picking
stocks or bonds for a portfolio not on the basis of whether a weak company will
manage to turn itself around, but rather on whether it will be nursed back to
health via an infusion of large-scale government support. How could the U.S.
ﬁnancial markets possibly function well if state intervention,as in the case of the
Chrysler bailout of 1979–80,h ad become commonplace? 
A counterproposal put forward by the U.S. Treasury and endorsed by many
investors and ﬁnancial intermediaries is a much better alternative.It represents a
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involving the introduction ofnew clauses into bond contracts to facilitate the debt
restructuring process.The main idea is that every bond contract should designate
a bondholder representative to act as an interlocutor with the sovereign debtor;
require the sovereign to provide more key ﬁnancial information to its bondhold-
ers;allow for a supermajority ofbondholders to amend payment terms,now often
requiring unanimity of consent; and include enforcement provisions that con-
centrate the power to initiate litigation in a single jurisdiction.14These new claus-
es have become widely known as collective action clauses (CACs), and while
several already exist in bonds issued under U.K. law, most new and outstanding
bonds of emerging-market sovereigns are issued in other jurisdictions, such as
New York and Frankfurt, where such clauses are not customary.
Most emerging-market issuers and investors were initially reluctant to intro-
duce CACs in new bond contracts for fear of signaling that they contemplate or
countenance an eventual default.Besides,even if such clauses are introduced vol-
untarily in all new debt issues,the stock of outstanding bonds would still be gov-
erned by preexisting legal arrangements, so that their practical effect will be
marginal for years to come. Under strong pressure from the U.S. Treasury, how-
ever, the governments of Mexico and Brazil were persuaded earlier this year to
issue new bonds with CACs, and they were successfully placed with institutional
investors at no measurable extra cost.Governments such as those of South Africa
and South Korea followed suit,although each sovereign bond issued so far carries
its own particular clauses that do not incorporate all of the language recom-
mended by ofﬁcial and private-sector groups. Consequently, a uniform market
standard in CACs is yet to develop.
While wider inclusion of CACs into sovereign bond contracts will probably
do no harm,it is doubtful that even their widespread application will make a vis-
ible difference to the workings of international ﬁnance. Of much greater signiﬁ-
cance would be a G-7decision to scale back the massive ofﬁcial support to certain
errant debtor nations.Ifthe IMF were to go back to providing seed money for eco-
nomic and policy turnarounds on as objective a basis as possible,this alone would
encourage governments and their creditors to consider much more seriously the
implications of falling into the abyss of default––regardless of whether improved
sovereign bankruptcy mechanisms are instituted. Moreover, it is patently unfair
that some governments should be lavished with ofﬁcial aid and others should be
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14 See Group of Ten, “Report of the G-10 Working Group on Contractual Clauses,” September 26, 2002;
available at www.bis.org/publ/gten08.pdf.starved,when the IMF is supposed to be a cooperative to which its member gov-
ernments should be able to turn for fairly automatic, albeit limited, help.
In addition,the very notion of a quick and painless debt restructuring is prob-
lematic both on an ethical and practical level. Ethically there should not be, I
believe,such a thing as a fast track to default,debt forgiveness,and ﬁnancial resur-
rection. The smoother the road to sovereign bankruptcy, the more likely it is that
governments will exhibit lack of ﬁscal discipline and “reform fatigue,”squandering
the proceeds of borrowed hard currency,in the knowledge that,if worse comes to
worst, they can obtain a ﬁnancial pardon. In practice, it is not possible to obtain
massive debt forgiveness via quick and painless debt restructurings. The recent
tragedy in Argentina, for example, would not have been avoided if the SDRM or
the CACs had been in place in 2001.Because a substantial proportion of the Argen-
tine government’s debt obligations was held by local banks, pension funds, and
insurance companies,any announcement of a payments standstill with the inten-
tion to seek meaningful debt forgiveness would surely have triggered a stampede
of bank depositors and a collapse of the pension and insurance industries. This
would have led to a run on the central bank’s ofﬁcial reserves,precipitating a dev-
astating currency devaluation and thus the same economic implosion, political
fallout,and popular discontent that were witnessed in late 2001 and early 2002.
In conclusion,bondholders and commercial and investment banks in the U.S.
and Europe should be recognized rather than castigated for their track record in
dealing with sovereign debt problems. They have helped to resolve expeditiously
and even generously the sovereign debt crises in which they have been involved in
various parts of the world, especially in recent years. The ofﬁcial development
community cannot make a similar claim.
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